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Buring the past fifty yearn, tb© world economy hah undergone 
a- drastic change* One of the significant developments in inter- 
national financial affairs in recent years has been the establishment 
of various institutions for international cooperation.: Ihe Bretton 
Woo# Conference was largely the result of the development of 
economic nationalism and the .failure to restore freedom in inter- 
' national transactions during the interwar period*.
' With the breakdown of the gold standard, the more-or-less 
automatic adjustment in the International. economic system, cam© to 
an end. fit© relatively, smooth functioning of international trans­
actions was interrupted. Economic activities between nations, moved 
_ from a situation of relative freedom towards the increasing us© of 
government controls*
A3 a substitute for the mechanism of the gold' standard, the 
Exchange Equalization Funds were founded in the leading countries 
to help revive a .degree of multilateral trad© which had existed under 
the fixed exchange standard* fhe idea behind the establishment of 
the Exchange Equalisation Fund© was to- combine the advantages of 
relatively stable exchange rates, at least in the short run, with 
some degree of long run flexibility to prevent too drastic a change 
in domestic prices •
fhe abolition of the gold standard resulted in a violent 
fluctuation of exchange rates* It was to remove these undue
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trade was contested fey Smith on the ground, that it Oft-
necessary restraint on international trade,
lie theory of Adam Smith ms adhered to and strengthened 
fey Savid. Ricardo and other classical economistŝ  Acceptance of 
laissez faire doctrine was* perhaps,.the basis for the state of 
relative stability which the world economy enjoyed for a period Of 
nearly one century before IfiA*
Adam' Smith clearly enunciated the principle Of free trade* 
the arguments -In its favor, he stated# ■ rested on the maximisation 
of production fey specialization. Savid liicardo analysed this prin­
ciple farther* If a country specialises' in the production of those 
commodities which it can produce with the least cost or the ' 
greatest comparative advantage and trade its products for goods 
which other countries can produce more cheaply#, the country will 
not only produce the greatest possible output but will gain from 
trading with 'another counter* A country will obtain a' larger quan­
tity of goods fey specialization and trade than fey trying to produce 
everything itself,
for centuries before the publication of Adam Smith*® Ag
M m M I A  Mm
international trade had been playing a significant role in the econ­
omic life of many countries# especially those coastal countries like 
Britain# France, Spain and Holland*
during the last quarter of the eighteenth century# the Indus­
trial Revolution brought about an Increase In productivity and devel­
opment of transportation* Ihe development' of transportation again 
facilitated the increasing volume of international trade* I-ere were
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donment of protective regulation and the full realization of free
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trade had- increased eight times from, 1830 to 1878. The annual 
average value of foreign trade between 1876 and 1880 was 13,070 
million dollars according to figures published by* the League of
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League of Nations, industrialization .and foreign Trade,
outbreak of the World War I, the figure of 40*500 million dollars was 
reached, In other words, value of world trade increased from 53.1 in 
1900 to 100 in 1913.8
the economic activities of the nineteenth century were charac­
terized by the increasing importance of specialization of production,
It was the development of transportation and the efficient operation 
of the institutions of international settlement vfoich enabled the 
nations of the world to expand their foreign trade. Exchange rates 
were reasonably stable and currencies of different nations were readily 
convertible* the gold standard was first adopted by Great Britain in 
1816 and in the 1870rs financially leading countries such as Germany, 
France and the United States, fixed the value of their monetary unit 
in terms of Its gold content,̂  the adoption of gold as tbeaonetary 
standard by those countries had brought the international gold stan­
dard into existence# this international gold standard contributed 
greatly to the smooth functioning of multilateral trade and settle­
ment#
We shall find that the establishment of the Exchange Equaliza­
tion Funds may be regarded as an important staging point in the transi­
tion from the breakdown of the international gold standard to the 
setting up of the International Monetary Fund. It will be shown also
® league of Nations, Industrialization and Foreign Trade. 
page 157.
 ̂ Germany adopted the gold standard in 1871, France in 1874 
and the United States in 1879# The United States was on bimetallic 
standard before that time. See Chandler, L. V#, The Economics of 
Money and Banking, pp# 119-12$.
that th# workliig ©i' the Exchange Equalisation fro# ilk the l?30's was 
IlialteS by the low .level of confidence which ms associated with the 
eftei^ffoots of World War I -and the impact of the Great Depression, 
■filler international ceoperat ion has -bee® aehiered 1® the pest $©rt<f 
■far 11 ■period through the Geaference at Bratton mods.
CBAfW II
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Before World War I* monetary systems throughout most ©f the
eerM were on the geld standard. A fixed relationship between
different monetary units was. maintained by their gold content, and
the. adjustment of the exchange rates- was at least partly automatic*
legal, tender money was convertible .into ..gold. ' The government or
central bank couM buy and soli .unrestricted amounts of gold at a
constant price* There were no restrictions placed upon imports
1.and 'exports of gold* iith' the so-called »rules« gold standard, 
countries were able to secure adjustment when disequilibrium in the 
balance of international payments occurred*' The result of the ' 
partly automatic, partly, regulated gold standard was maintenance
gof stable rates.of foreign exchange*
Ijhen war broke out in Europe in 1914, one immediate step 
taken by the authorities was the abandonment of the gold 'Standard*. 
The right to free export and import of gold, the most important 
.mechanism of the gold standard, was suspended in the belligerent 
countries and the majority of neutral states.̂
One of the immediate reasons for the abolition of the gold 
standard upon the outbreak of the war was the need to preserve the
1 The outflow and inflow of gold would bring about adjustment 
in disequilibrium, through credit structure -and price level*.
■ ̂  -Compare Boniding, $* S., leoaomie Analysis* pp. 96-98.
3. See Chandler, I,.. V*, The Economics of Money and Banking;, 
pp.*. 127*438. ........ .
0>
§
t
ia
I1
§
Following the abandonment #f the gold standard many countries 
dieted, a paper standard. The value of paper money was- determined ' 
largely by the scarcity 4f the currency recognized as a. means of 
payment* M spite of the fact that, a certain amount of gold wasI$%
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Budgetary deficits appeared in most ©f the belligerent countries*̂
InalX the belligerent countries, governments had to resort to 
unusual methods of raising funds fey creating artificial purchasing 
power.̂  Money was required to finance the war, but there was no 
possibility that taxation or tariffs could be increased immediately , 
Although th© governments later on could secure some money from usual 
sources, such as borrowing or selling: in vestments abroad, this was a 
small amount as compared with the requirements of war expenditures, 
therefore, it was Impossible for the belligerent count lies to pre­
vent the issue of additional paper money .
Inflation was not confined, to belligerent countries? it 
spread to neutral nations very rapidly,̂  the United States included, 
the needs for state finance and the demand from the belligerent 
countries for credits caused the neutral countries to create arti­
ficial purchasing power.̂
Although free export and import of gold was suspended from 
the outbreak of the war, gold did not entirely remain in the central
. ̂ ' Chandler, L, fhe .Economics of Money and 
page 128.
 ̂ linzig. P., World Finance 1914-193$, .page 35.
8 Cassel, Q.| Money and Foreign Exchange After 1911, page 11.
t fhe neutral nations granted credits »., .to the belliger­
ents far exceeded the amounts their available funds should have
allowed, was mainly due to the interest neutral states had in keep­
ing up their exports,” The belligerent countries were unable to make 
entire payment for their imports because of insufficient export, 
therefore, they had to ask credit for importation* Cassel, G.j
l « »  m& .tela. m & s m  m m  Mk> w  ia .
banka of the belligerent countries * It ms used to a large extent 
in payments for war materials from abroad or to support loan opera** 
tions in foreign countries. Belligerent countries commonly imported 
more than they could export j therefore* it was necessary to ship gold 
to make up the difference* Since the belligerent countries purchased 
their war necessities fro® neutral nations* gold found its way from 
belligerent to neutral states, the United States, due to its neu­
tral position in the early part of the war and its position as a 
large supplier of war materials, was the country which absorbed the 
largest amount of gold during the war period.
As a result of the gold movements during the war, the hold­
ings of gold- reserve of belligerent countries— Belgium, Prance, ■ Italy 
and Aust r ia-H ungary— were less than what they were before the out­
break of the war * the gold reserve of those belligerent countries 
on the European Continent decreased from 1556.2 million dollars in 
1915 to 1236,2 million dollars in 1921, a net deduction of 320
I Qmillion dollars, Great Britain, due to its independence from the 
direct damage of the war and the strength gained before 1914, had in­
creased its gold holding between 1913 and 1921* She situation in
X Ithe neutral nations was quite (afferent, and a net increase of 
1478,5 million dollars was recorded* Iheir holdings in 1913 were
i0 Cassel, G.» Money and foreign Exchange After 1914, • 
page 67, 
x i Sweden, Norway, Denmark, The Netherlands, Spain, Japan, 
Switzerland and Argentine* Argentine, Japan and Spain were belli­
gerent countries. But we included these countries here because they 
did not receive damages directly from the war,
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Since the agreements for the settlement -or renewal of debts, 
which existed, before the war, were suspended after 1914, the elate
International financial -affaire underwent a fundamental change, w$m 
York had risen to -be an important financial center of the world as a
In order to restore the smooth .functioning, of international ■ 
trade and finance after the war, re-establishment of exchange rates 
was required because- of the variation .in the degree of inflation .and 
the change in relative productivity .
It was to deal with the problem of'the re-establishment of
the exchange rates in the changed economic situation that Gustav
Cassel suggested a theory of purchasing power parity as - a solution.
He said that the exchange rates should be set on the basis of the
relative change la the purchasing power of various currencies *■
■Our- willingness to pay a certain price for foreign 
money must ultimately and essentially be- due to the 
fact that this money possesses a .purchasing power as 
against canmodities and services- in that foreign 
country. On the other hand, when we offer so and so 
much of our -own money, m  -are actually offering a pur­
chasing power as against commodities and service® in 
our own country. Our valuation of a foreign currency 
in terms of our- own, therefore, mainly depends on the 
relative- purchasing power of the two currencies' in 
the respective countries .IS
&  Sinsig, f*., World .finance 1914-1935. pp. 19*40*
— , — », Sm Sum i, imSs^SmHssi jsssiisssisaii . f f t e r  1 9 1 4 »page 138*
of relative equilibrium in international finance was interrupted.
result of the war*2̂
See Ashworth, f „ A Short History of 
>0-1950. pp. 186-188 ,'''
the international
■U
Cassel emphasized the importance of the purchasing power parity 
feeing calculated m  the basis of the fall in the: value of money sine# 
1934* . Si. ether words* the exchange rates should fee determined oh 
the basis of the value of different currencies which existed at the 
time of International equilibrium' and of the change in this pur- ■ 
chasing power* this is to soy that, if .the degree of inflation is 
more violent in .one country tban in the others the currency of the 
-.country had depreciated to a larger extent and Its purchasing power 
should fee smaller in, terms of another currency.
To achieve the purpose of calculating the purchasing power 
.parities- which were to fee adopted; .as. exchange •rates feet ween paper 
moneys in the post-war world*, .a knowledge ©f the basis of the pre­
war emehaufeg© fates and of the degree of inflation' of different - 
currencies, was required* tassel saids
.the - exchange rate between two countries must 
always fix Itself in accordance with, the price level 
.in either country so that 4 certain amount of trade ■ 
between them becomes possible. * -.that trade between 
two. '̂ countries can not, m  is frequently imagined, - 
fee nullified or .even hindered through the level of 
prices in one of the countries being high, 16
the theory of Sassel's purchasing power parity was abaftdened 
because of the -difficulty in selecting an adequate index number, 
that is to say* the relative equilibrium of international trade' 
might fee affected fey many other factors such as the change in trade 
methods*, la example- of this was the imposition of exchange controls.
There had been an ©pinion that everything would return.to
i©©&t18£•»I4*3IJZ<*401©©jet4̂J*$mZ
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tended in accentuate the existing inflation.■ At last, the infla­
tion mm ended with financial collapse.
After the war* there had been m endeavor to return to a 
pre-war state of international financial affairs # ixefe&stge control
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the straggle to revive' the international gold standard was 
made all the ©ore difficult also because most countries did not have 
adequate holdings of gold for the purpose. The uneven distribution 
of gold, an effect of the war, was seen in the fact that at the end 
of 191$ the Federal Reserve Rank of the United State© and. Treasury 
held 520 million pounds, while the central hanks and treasuries - of 
Great Britain and France retained 263 million pounds of gold out of 
the estimated sum total of 1335 million pounds of gold held in 
central, hank© and treasuries of the countries of the world.- 
.», .The distribution of this cm between different countries is- 
exceedlngly uneven and bears no steady proportion to the volume 
of their economic .activities**.1̂
'Unable to restore the gold standard because of the existing 
Shortage and/or maldistribution of gold, stock in the postwar years, 
the gold .exchange standard was adopted as an .alternative. In seme 
countries. Under this standard, any country that did hot have- a 
sufficient supply of gold could maintain a fixed relationship be-. 
tween gold and' its currency by establishing a fixed rate of exchange 
between its currency and the currency of a major trading power which 
was on the full gold standard*, 'the gold exchange standard countries 
were not bound to redeem their notes. in gold coin, or to buy or sell 
gold bullion*
The years 1924 and 1925 were important in the economic history
21 Keynes, J. M*, A Treatise on Honey. yol* II, page 297*.
** Ibid*, 297*
of the post-war world. It ms la 1924 that all of the inflationary 
countries la. Europe were able to- stabilize their currencies and 
achieve their first balanced budget® since the outbreak, of the war, 
the world currency situation ms much improved. Economic expansion, 
which had been interrupted since 1914, ms resumed* »it ms the 
first year in which the volume of world trade passed its«pf#msr 
level. . ,1925 ms also the first year in vhieh European primary pro­
duct ion reached .and exceeded the level, of I913j...,)2̂  ■ She index: of 
laanufacturing for the world as a whole ms l2l in. 1925 as compared 
■with 1Q0 in 1915.- Many signs indicated that the world was on the 
my to prosperity, the achievement of .stability of currency and 
balanced budgets enabled many countries ■ bo return, to the gold stan­
dard but in a modified forte*,
During the post-war years.,, cooperative efforts were mad© 
.Internationally to .stabilize value of currencies * Hew fork banks ' 
mad©' large, loans to those countries' which were in need of'gold In 
order &©■■ restore their gold standard,2̂  Ey dune, 1924, the .curri­
cles Of Sweden and Austria were able to establish a connection with 
gold* And in April, 1925, Great Britain placed Its currency on a 
gold basis* Austria, Hew Zealand, the Netherlands* 'South Africa 
and Hungary followed suit* Between duly,.. 1925 and duly, 192?, Chile, 
Finland, Canada, Belgium, Denmark and. India restored the fixed
lewis, ¥* A*, Economic Survey 1919-1939. pp. 34-35*
24
&  dee Einzia* P* * told finance 1914-1935..* chanters 2$X*
X y i l  BXlVL X V I J i *
19
relationship between gold and their currencies. Argentina, Poland, 
Italy, Norway, Greece and Prance returned to gold in the following 
m o n t h s ,^
The British authority’s decision to return to the gold stan­
dard at pre-war parity met with opposition, Mr. Winston Churchill 
was at that time Chancellor of the Exchequer and responsible for 
this decision; experience before 1914 had been of 4.86 dollars to 
the pound and "prestige" demanded a return at the same level of ex­
change with gold. J. M. Keynes argued vigorously against the 
restoration of prewar parity. He aaids
Money-wages, the cost of living, and the prices which 
we are asking for our exports have not adjusted them­
selves to the improvement in the exchange, which the 
expectation of your restoring the Gold Standard, in 
accordance with your repeated declarations, has al­
ready brought about. They are about 10 percent too 
high. If, therefore, you fix the exchange at this 
gold parity, you must either gamble on a rise in gold 
prices abroad, which will induce foreigners to pay a 
higher gold price for your exports, or you are com­
mitting yourself to a policy of forcing down money 
wages and the cost of living to the necessary extent...
It is certain to involve unemployment and industrial 
disputes...there will be great depression in the ex­
port industries...Nevertheless, the cost of living will 
not fall sufficiently and, consequently, the export in­
dustries will not be able to reduce their prices suf­
ficiently, until wages have fallen in the sheltered 
industries. Therefore, you have to see to it that 
there is unemployment in the sheltered industries 
also.27
The disequilibrium in the co3t of living and the level of
26 Ganteinbein, J. Financial Questions in United States 
Foreign Policy, p. 12.
27 Keynes, J. M., The Economic Consequences of Mr. 
Churchill, pp. 12-13.
stages between the dollar and sterling can be seen la-the following
t a b l e t
March 1924 
Becember 
March 1925 
duly*
P̂rovisional
Source: Keynes, y, I.*, The Economic Consequences of ||r«- Churchill» p.?.
As Keynes had predicted* the return in the old parity brought 
difficulty to British. Industry, there were the coal strike end a 
general strike in %$2&* the year after the restoration of -the gold 
standard. Bnemploymeni and depression put the hopes that the adjust­
ment would fee brought about through reducing prices and. costs ft
Great Britain to an end* It was also realised that the 'adjustment
20through a rise ft aopM prices, to the-.British level was hopeless. '
As the -result of the failure of the readjustment, the disequilibrium 
of the price level and consequently the cost-of 'living continued ft 
succeeding years.
During the .last part of the l920*s, there was • a speculative 
boom .In the Baited States which .reached its peak in October, 1929. 
the slump which first appeared ft the Wall- Street crash immediately 
spread- an acute economic depression ft the Bulled States.', Not long 
later* the wave of great depression crossed the national, boundary and
level of the Cost of Living and Wages
Baited States Great Britain Great Britain
cost of living cost of living' wages
(&°m (gold) (sterling) CgeM) (sterling)
m 15? ' 178 ' .155 l?b
158 m 181 m 119
158 m m - 17? 181158 m m 18# 18#
28 See A Idealise on Money, fol, II, Keynes, 1, pp. 101-
■07#-
reached Into almost every part of the world. Industrial activities 
had decreased markedly; there was widespread unemployment and incomes 
were greatly reduced. The decline in industrial activities can be 
seen in the following indices of industrial production:
1929 1930 1931 • 1932
Consumer goods 100 90 8$ 75Investment goods 100 74 51 31
Source; Lewis, W. A., Economic Survey 1919*1939. page 54*
Supply elasticities in fundamentally manufacturing countries 
were greater than supply elasticities for primary producing coun­
tries. Therefore, the prices did not decline so much in industrial­
ized countries as in the countries producing raw materials. Unem­
ployment, however, was greater in industrialised countries, because 
those countries producing food and raw materials found themselves 
unable to reduce their production and their prices declined to a 
greater extent. Consequently, their income from international trade 
contracted rapidly. Since they were unable to secure foreign loans 
to make up the difference between imports and exports, the food and 
raw material exporting countries were forced to reduce their im­
ports} the value of international trade fell greatly. A comparison 
of the change in production and trade is shown in the following 
table;
Volume of Production and Tfrade, 1929, 1932 and 1937
(1929-100)
1929 1932 1937
Foodstuffs
World trade 100 89 93*5
World production 100 100 108
Raw Materials 
World trade 
World production 
Manufactures 
World trade 
World production
Source* lewis, f * A* Economic Survey. 1919-1939. page 58.
■ 4ft#r the slump in-1929* the-pound sterling was- still in the 
position that it was in 1925 when the pound returned to gold at pre-­
war- parity. Became of rigidity' of the - currency relationship* the 
cost of production and price level in. Great Britain failed t© ad* 
lust to the- world level* Consequently, the imbalance in. foreign 
trade increased instead of decreasing.
' |a the last half of duly* 1931* the -persistent weakness of 
the pound sterling worked against the continuance of the gold stan­
dard. tiers had been heavy withdrawals of deposits from louden by 
foreign holders* As a result* the Bank of England lost a substan­
tial part of its. gold, reserve, prance, in view of the disadvantage 
that would he caused should the pound sterling depreciate* had 
offered its support to sterling*.̂
I first credit of 50 million pounds and a second credit of
80 million pounds were .granted to Britain by tooth the United States 
3 0and France. But it was a small amount in a time of such great 
uncertainty and* it helped very little to change the situation.
100 81*5 I08
100' % 116
100 59*5 87100 70 120
^  Jhe Economist. Vol. eilV-.sup 9*10* February 13, 1932* 
30 Ibid.. page 9.
The flight from the pound continued end the credits arranged were 
used up very quickly.
Through August and September, 1931> sterling, was subject to 
great .pressure resulting .fro® the withdrawals of foreignfunds, 
flight of British capital and speculative operations. There was 
hot much choice for Great Britain, but to suspend lbs gold standard 
©a September 21, 1931, six years after its restoration.
Since the pound sterling; was. overvalued, prices of British 
commodity were too highly priced in the world market. Therefore, 
the depreciation or the devaluation of •sterling was necessary...
Many foreign holders of. the pound sterling- suffered serious- 
loss m  an immediate effect of the depreciation* But It was- evi­
dent that Great. Britain, benefifcted by this- depreciation; it re­
sulted In an increase ©f the competitive capacity of.British ex- 
. porting goods in international .markets * fine example of the 
devaluation of sterling can be seen in that the doHar-sterling
exchange rate fell from 4.36 dollars to the pound on September yl
•21to %,% dollars to the pound, on October 1*
A few countries followed finest Britain In going off the gold 
Standard* Most of the currencies of the British lapire, except the 
Canadian dollar and .South African pound, followed the example of the 
pound sterling immediately, Sweden, Finland and Japan went off
3 2gold between September and December, 1931.
Grump, N., The ABC of Foreign Exchange, page 152.
32' gee Gantenbein, J, W,, Financial questions in felted
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year, There -was also a heavy ilm of foreign capital to London.
the flights of foreign capital to London continued, the 
..Bank of England had .to bpy foreign exchange in order to avoid un­
necessary appreciation of the pound sterling in relation to 'other
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cey Slnzig, IV,, World- Finance 191̂ *1935, page .340-,-
until July* 1932* Foreign exchanges fluctuated, widely during the 
period*
It was- to counteract the undesirable fluctuations- in exchange 
rates that, the British Government established the Exchange Equaliza­
tion Recount in July* 1932, with funds of l$0 million pounds under 
th# authority of 'the Finance Act of 1932.^ the Exchange Equaliza­
tion Account acted an a stabilizer of foreign exchanges. during the 
succeeding years*
^  for further information on the establishment of the Ex­
change Equalization Account see* Hall', N* P*, ffhe Exchange Squallza- 
tion AQcount, chapter III, Hfhe Organiehtioa of the Exchange Equaliza­
tion Account'*1*
chapter i n
ESTABLISHMENT OF MGHANGB EQUALIZATION FUNDS
In spite of the step taken by British authorities to raise 
interest rates, many hundred millions of pounds in. foreign funds were 
withdrawn from London after July, 1931. This notion by foreign 
holders of sterling deposits caused the suspension of the gold stan­
dard in September, only two months after the flight from the pound 
1started* It was not because Interest rates in Britain were not 
high enough, but confidence in the positinn of the pound had been 
destroyed.̂  The withdrawals led to the belief that Britain would 
not fee able to .remain on the gold standard and this belief again 
accentuated the withdrawals. there was a rash on the part of 
foreign holders to get their money out of London.
An immediate consequence of the withdrawals was the loss of
gold reserve fey the Bank of England; one example of this was seen
in that S million pounds of gold was withdraw m  the 14th of 
3July.- Since the gold reserves were an essential port of the gold 
standard the heavy drain of the gold reserves made the continuance 
of the gold standard impossible*
A great relief was felt through Great Britain after the sus­
pension ©f the gold standard. The sterling exchange rates with
* For further information see, the Economist. Vol. CXlVj 
sup 9-10, February 13, 1932, "Foreign Exchanges*1, 1931.
* Compare League of Nations, International Currency Experi­
ence. pp. 19-40,
 ̂ The Economist, Vol. GXIVj sup 9, February 13, 1932.
other currencies were allowed to adjust freely, Since there had been 
an overvaluation of the pound when it was on the gold standard, the 
natural result of the suspension was a depreciation of sterling*
The exchange rate between the dollar and the pound fell from 4*86 
dollars to the pound to 3*94 dollars to the pound on October 1, 1951, 
tea days after the suspension* The exchange ratio with the french 
franc fell from 124 • 21 francs to 190 francs to the pound on October 1* 
And the gold price in London rose from 85g to l40a per fine ounce 
from September 21 to October 1,L
Hie depreciation of the pound reversed the foreign trade 
position of great Britain* British commodities were high-priced in 
the international markets when the exchange rates were based on old 
parity. By the end of 1931, British exports had reached an advan­
tageous position in competition with other countries in the inter-
5national markets,' Hie improvement in the British trade position 
resulted in greater confidence in the pound sterling and, as a re­
sult, a trend of flight of capital to London began, especially of 
those currencies which were on the gold basis j the improvement in 
British foreign trade is evidenced by the fact that »...the share 
of Britain In World exports, which had declined from 10*75 per cent 
in 1929 to 9,36 per cent in 1931, advanced to 9*92 per cent in 1932 
and 10.37 per cent in 1933•
4 Crump, h*, Hie ABG of the foreign Exchange, page 152.
5 Compare, the Economist, Vol. CXVj 927, Hovember 19, 1932*
6 Lewis, W, A., Economic Purvey, 1919-1939i page 82.
the Waited Slates was one of the countries which suffered 
from the depreciation of the pound, due to the repatriation of British 
capital from Hew fork. When the flight from the dollar to the pound 
began* the dollar exchange rates frequently fell below the gold ex­
port point. Paring the month of October* 1931* there was a heavy out­
flow of gold from Hew fork which amounted to 337*7 million dollars.̂  
This was the time that the pound gained confidence while the dollar 
lost it.
In the early months of 1932* confidence in sterling was so 
firmly established that British authorities had to take steps to 
counteract the inflow movements ©f foreign funds to iondon. It was 
thought that if an offsetting action were not taken, the pound 
sterling would be forced to a level of overvaluation* and the 
appreciation of the pound sterling would surely have deprived 
British goods of their supremacy in the international markets.
A large purchase of American dollars and French francs was 
made fey the Bank of England to repay the credits which had been 
granted by America and France during the period of the flight from 
the pound? at the end of October, 1931, 20 million pounds of the 
Franco-Amerlcan credits were repaid.® Mienever there was an offer 
of foreign currency or currencies, the Bank of England had to be 
ready to buy those foreign currencies and sell pounds* The Bank 
of England, in its position as agent of the British Treasury, acted
^ Federal Beserve Bulletin, Vol. IB, Ho. 7, duly , 1932, 
page 440.
 ̂ The Economist, Vol. GXIV; sup 9, February 13, 1933*
as stabiliser to prevent violent fluctuation® of foreign exchange*
In thi® situation, continuous effort® were ma.de by the Bank of England
to control the fluctuations of sterling in terras of other currencies*
.But “there was, however, a limit to the resources which the Bank, of
England could, legimately invest in foreign change- holding*. while
it m& hardly fair to ask the Bank to assume the risk of heavy less
which these operations.' in fluctuating exchange markets entailed.*̂
In late 1931 and early 1932, seme of the francs and dollars
secured by the Bank of England were exchanged for gold, glace there
was a. large repatriation and flight fro® the franc and the dollar,
the Bank- found itself in the position of holding a large quantity .of
gold and foreign exchange. Therefore it was decided in early larch,
1932 to let sterling find its own level In order to avoid further
|0.accumulation of dollars and. francs. Consequently the pound sterl­
ing showed a tendency to appreciate*
In order to eliminate the appreciation of sterling, to avoid 
.increased holding of foreign currencies and to leave seme degree of 
freedom in the foreign exchange market, a solution was needed* There­
fore the British Goverment, in its budget statement of 1932, pro­
posed. the establishment of the Exchange Equalisation Account which 
was to play a significant role in international finance in the
9 III* Economist* Vol. CXVI; sup 6, May'13, 1933*- The Bank 
of England has been a private institution. Since the foreign ex­
change operations are undertaken in the public• interest, it is con­
sidered only right to be conducted with public funds.
10 See Karris, S. £., Exchange Depreciation, chapter XV, 
also the Economist. Vol., CXVI;" syp 6, ^  13, 1933', and Pumpbrey,
L. M., “The Exchange Equalisation Account of Great Britain,"
American jQonomlcReview. Vol.*. XXK1I. Ho* 4, December, 1942, page 803.
succeeding years
la establishing the Account, consideration las given to the 
facts that the fund must be large enough to- eliminate any form of 
speeulatio&and that the operations of the Account must be deter* 
mined in secret, for the possession of the knowledge about -the 
Operations'of the Account by -speculators would surely moderate the. 
effectiveness of its- actions.,.
As for the objects of the Exchange Equalisation Account* they 
'were stated by Heville Chamberlain, then Chancellor of Exchequer, 
as' follows?:
fo smooth out the variation catted by three, sets of 
phenomena-*"** 'firstly,, the seasonal fluctuations 
secondly,, the operations of speculators, tMoh in­
crease those seasonal fluctuations, and other flue*, 
tnations, boos .and thirdly, this special flight of 
Capital from other countries for the sake of .finding 
a safer place to stop in for a time. 12 .
diace,there ms no reason to believe that the foreign funds
would stay forever in- London, the Exchange Equalization Account ms
designed -as. a temporary .residence for the floating funda.^ ' The
Account was also used to keep the movement of “hot moneyfrom
affecting the internal banking and credit ■ structure., because it
was believed that the foreign money could move to and from London
u  &52ig, P., World finance, page m >
laight, L., The History and Mechanism ̂ ; the S E l B E  
m Account. page 11.
^  See Paisb, F, W., #®*e British Exchange Equalization 
Fund*', Economica, fcl, II, page 61, 1935.
■M Those funds ‘which moved .from one center to
another in .seeking security or profit were called !%ot money.
very quickly if the confidence in the pound, sterling changed.1^
the volume of floating funds had increased greatly since the
end of WorM 'far X, and these funds, in the hands of speculators-,
moved from one financial center to another at frequent intervals
whenever there uas a chaise in feeling -of security and potential
profitability., for example, if the value of the pound sterling rose,
there would surely follow an increase in purchases ©f the pound by
foreigners. Xheae purchasers hoped, not Only to resell the pound at
%/La profit | they 'also tried, to us® these funds for other purposes* 
After Orest Britain went off the .gold standard in September, 1931, 
there was considerable doubt that seme gold standard countries here­
to follow the British example; therefore, many owners: of these funds 
became restless about .their safety and transferred their money from 
one place to -Mother in seeking security.
In his budget speech of April If, If3%. the day- the plan 
for the establishment of the Exchange Equalisation Account was mate 
public# J&V leville Chamberlain described the "disturbing influence* 
which- was caused by the transfer of American- liquid -capital upon 
the sterling exchange.
'♦If we are to avoid violent and perilous fluctuations 
in our currency, especially those which, are due to 
these speculative- operations* if m  are to enable 
this -country to function effectively as the math- 
' financial center of the world, then it is essential 
for us to-' hold adequate reserves of gold and foreign 
exchanges, in order that we may -meet My sudden with-*
- Grump, S., '̂ Stabilisation* when as and if", Banking, Vol.
m m *  May, mt>*
^  Such as purchasing stock of industrial companies.
drawal of short-dated capital and cheek .arid repel . 
these speculative movements .
He continuedi
,,,tfeat it #111 give us a very large and extended 
power of purchasing exchange* fh# new powers„. 
will, enable u$ to deal far sore effectively than we 
could otherwise have- dene either with m  unwanted' 
inflow of -capital or# if the alternative should, 
again arise, with m  outflow of capital from this 
. country*-̂
- The Exchange Equalization Account was also designed to inter­
vene .against speculators in the exchange market at any time without 
warning.;*0 this is to say that the Account could operate is oppo­
sition to the speculators .In order to offset the- effect of their 
manipulations*.
. Between September, 1931, vhen Britain left the gold standard 
and the time when the United ft ate® suspended the- gold' standard in. 
March, 1933, the movements of the pound sterling became a main 
factor in determining world prices ,*̂  So important was the position 
of Great Britain as a financial center of world trade ai- that tame# 
that British authorities' could exercise a powerful influence on the. 
foreign exchange market,20 The Exchange Equalization Account, which
^  Comstock, A,-,# «fhe British Exchange Equalization Account 
the American Economic Review, fol, IXIII, So, 4, page 409,
^  Compare, Puaphrey, 1*M., «the Exchange Equalization 
Account of Great Britain,« the /uaerican Economic Bevlew, fol, XXXII, 
No. 4, December, 1942, pp. 303*805 .
Sterling was the- most important currency among the freely 
fluctuating currencies- .at that, time*,
20 See Eitwig* P., World Finance 1914^935* pp.* 239-242.
was ©stabl%hed by the finance Act of 1932, played this role: In in*
iernatiooal finance during the 1930%, although th© primary object
of the operations of the Account 'mas to eliminate unwanted fluctoa«
CtOhe of the sterling exchange.
fhe Exchange Equalization Account was endowed with .resources
of Ip mllion pouffe plus approximately aS &illion pounds which
were transferred from. Che balance of the credit of the d i  dollar
e x c h a n g e  a c c o u n t  a t  t h e  t i m e  1 %  w a s  s e t  u p  m  l u l y  1 ,  1 9 3 2 * ^ '
the Exchange Equalization Account thus began Its operation
with assets totaling 173 million pounds, ,fhe Account operated' as a
government department under the British treasury and its operations
were carried out in the Ibreign exchange market, the .money market,
22■ and the gold tttffetfe* -- the Account mas also able to exercise influ­
ence on the stock exchange*
An expressed In. the finance Ait of 1132, the duty if the 
managers of the Account was to .infest its,funds “in securities or 
in the purchase: of gold in. such manner as they think best adapted 
for checking undue fluctuations in- the exchange value of sterling. 
Hie purpose of the Account mas again stated, as to ward off the
21 for; more detail iafomation see Comstock, A*, *Hte British 
Ixeh&aa© loualization Account,*̂  the American Economic Eeview. Vol.
K P I, «», 4, txtmmt, 1333* PfTZsmSa:'..
22 Pumphre?, L. a., "The Exchange Squali2ation Account of
Great Britain.» the American . M m E H S B f  vol. m m  *•, a> 
December, 1942, page '
23 finance Act, 1932# Section 24(3)# faight, 3,*, Jhg 
History and Mechanism off the British Exchange Equalization Account,
P #  ............
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reading of the Finance Act of l$3i by sayings «...the risks invol'1 
to the feaiqjayers 'in til© 03© of this fund are very considerable*» | 
continued* «. ..If the fund is to be used fey these methods that we
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assets of the Account would be changed from treasury Sills to 
foreign currencies,
_ The Account facilitated short̂ tena capital aovesteats and 
prevented them froro disturbing either the exchange or the m m ?
Account was to sell foreign currency
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or out of the Exchange Equaliaafcion Account* it did not become the 
gold reserves of the Bank of England* therefore* It did hot effeet 
the internal hanking and credit structure .at It v M k  .hate under 
the gold standard system.- the inflow of gold, affected the m m ?
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ft is clear that., under the gold £t®dard mechanism, the 
deposits of the commercial banks can fee increased by many times the 
amount of the -original increase 'of geld which has come into the 
Bank-of England, On the. other hard, the' deposits .of commercial 
banks -will be decreased by many times the amount of the. original 
decrease of the ®ouni .of gold which has. flensed out of the Bank of 
England* •■ Since the effect of the gold flow is no great, the Bank • 
of England had.to raise or reduce interest rates.®4 to discourage 
or encourage bank. loans- whenever there were unusual movement# of 
gold*- ■
But under the Exchange Equalisation Recount, the,credit could 
be expanded or contracted by only the amount of the- original increase 
or decrease of the amount of gold* the effect of gold movement was 
not so great |. .the Bank of England had more time, to 'investigate the 
situation and take proper measures*.
As mentioned above, the .British Exchange Equalization Account
m  Crump, S., "Stabiliaation, when m  and If”, Banking* 
V&# %$$&*
38
was controlled by the Treasury, but its operations were carried out
by the Bank of England. Several writers have written the principles
of the working of the Exchange Equalization Account^ but L.
Weight*s description Is a leading one. He says;
The first principle is to counter any undue buying 
or selling of sterling not in any way connected with 
the normal purchases and sales on commercial account 
with which it is desired to interfere as little as 
possible. Bhen, for example, sterling is being 
bought not for the settlement of goods or services 
obtained in this country or for interest payments on 
money formerly borrowed or for any other normal pro­
cedure of this kind, but specula!ively in anticipa­
tion of a profit on the purchase or because foreigners 
consider that their capital would be safer if con­
verted into sterling, then it is the duty of the E*
I. A. to sell sterling in the quantities required so 
that, supply and demand being equal, the exchange 
ratios of sterling with other currencies will not 
fluctuate to any great extent. Similarly, if 
reason other than - normal sterling is subjected to 
pressure, that is, if it is being offered in large 
quantities, it is the duty of the E. S. A. to sell 
foreign currencies or gold and buy sterling, equating 
again, so far as possible, supply with demand, to 
maintain the exchange ratio* This has been described 
as "ironing out" fluctuations in the exchanges.
The second principle to be remembered is that from 
the point of view of the safety of the funds en­
trusted to the managers of the E. E. A. it is a 
fundamental obligation on them to exchange sterling, 
whenever they have to do so in accordance with the 
first principle, only ibr foreign currencies which
gee; Harris, S. E«, Exchange Depreciation, chapter XV. 
league of Rations, International Currency Experi­
ence. chapter VI*
Account
Account of Great Britain", the American Economic Review. Vol. XXXII, 
No. 4, December, 1942. """" ""
Whittlesey, C. H., International Monetary Issues,
pp. 8-9.
Paish, F, W., "The British Exchange Equalization 
Fund", Economics, New Series Vol. II, No. 5-<8*
can be exchanged for gold on demand. This is im­
portant for the primary reason just mentioned and 
because' of subsequent changes in the characteristics.
’of the E, B. into which we shall enquire.later* 
fither countries followed Britain in suspending gold 
'payments .and operated a managed currency standard or 
what is more commonly known as a paper standard*
.‘the currencies of such countries were outside the 
sphere- of operations of the I* 4. because those 
currencies., ' if acquired# could not be automatically 
converted to gold* Britain can. have no control 
whatever over the value of paper standard currencies, 
but as regards gold this country can -ultimately fix 
a ratio- of sterling-to. gold which it considers do*-, 
Simble.
There ia a further reason why sterling -should be ex­
changed -only for gold*, ■ foreiga capital Which sought 
refuge here will one day return to the country of"
.-origin# in which case the E* S* 4. will be in a 
.position' to supply Whichever currency is wanted If 
it has gold ih its keeping* Bold gives safety as 
well, as the maximum of utility from the point- of 
view of the B* E* 4*
■ the third principle .is no less Important . . the ac­
quisition of abnomal quantities of sterling by 
foreigners .and the gold intimately received In ox- 
change- for that sterling- would normally expand the 
credit structure of -this, country):, conversely, gold' 
given in- exchange for- foreign-owned funds on repatri­
ation would normally lead to a contraction of credit*
.gut -having vivid memories of the dire consequences 
which followed the sudden withdrawal of foreign Capi­
tal fro®, this- country in 1931# the authorities have 
invented a means of neutralising such movements of 
-capital*, this principle, then, can be described as 
one- of offsetting! offsetting an influx or efflux -of 
foreign capital or insulating the domestic structure 
.from, irrelevant external influences.̂
The third principle, the practice of offsetting operations, 
Can be further illustrated as follows-?, when co&aereial banks in­
crease their deposits as- a result of the .increase in foreign- money,
Weight, L., The history and Mechanism ©g the. 
Equalization iooount* pp*. 12-14. ■■■-— ■-
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See Einzigj f»** forid Finance 1914*1935, copter 'XM
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and the dollar was allowed to depreciate ,3$
The depreciation of the dollar strengthened the competitive 
position of the United States in international markets. Bat those 
countries which remained on the gold basis were subject to pressure 
because they had to compete not only with «steriing bloc” countries, 
but with the United States even though the effects of depreciation 
had been offset to some extent by the rise in commodity prices*
it has been stated that "the suspension of the gold standard 
in the United States provided the turning-point in the world crisis. 
Commodity prices showed a rising trend * During the same period no 
attempts were made on the part of the United States Government to 
stabilise exchange rates at a certain levelj in other words, the 
foreign exchanges were allowed to depreciate to whatever extent 
it might occur*
In January, 1934, the time seemed right for the stabilisation 
of the dollar in terms of gold# 3to his message to congress, Presi­
dent Roosevelt proposed enactment of the Gold Reserve let# in which 
a proposal for the establishment of the Exchange stabilisation Fund 
was contained:
With the establishment of this permanent policy, 
placing all monetary gold in the ownership of the 
Government as a bullion base for its currency, the 
time has come for a more certain determination of 
the gold value of the American dollar* Because 
of world uncertainties, 1 do not believe it de­
sirable in the public interest that an exact value
32 See Federal Reserve Bulletin, Vol. 19, So* 3, March, 1933# 
pp. 113-1335 also Vol. 19, Ho. 4, April, 1933, PP» 209-21B.
33 Einzig, P., World Finance 1914-193$* page 15a*
43
be now fixed...Careful study leads me to believe 
that any revaluation at more than 60 per eent of 
the present statutory value would not be in the 
public interest. I, therefore* recommend to the 
Congress that it fix the upper limit of permissible 
, revaluation at 60 per cent.
that we may be further prepared to bring some greater 
degree of stability to foreign exchange rates in the 
interests of our people* there should be added to 
the present power of the Secretary of the Treasury 
to buy and sell gold at home and abroad* express 
power to deal in foreign exchange as such* As a 
part of this power* X suggest that* out of the pro­
fits of any devaluation* there should be set a fund 
of |2,000,000,000 for such purchases and sales of 
gold, foreign exchange, and Government securities 
as the regulation of the currency, the maintenance 
of the credit of the Government, and the general 
welfare of the United States may require,34
Thus the price of gold was fixed at 35 dollars per fine 
ounee^ when the Gold Reserve Act was passed by Congress and ap­
proved by President Roosevelt, The new gold price was equal to 
59.06 per cent depreciation from its old parity. The United States 
Exchange Stabilization Fund was established to smooth out unwanted 
fluctuations in foreign exchange.
Following the establishment of the British Exchange Equali­
zation Account in 1932, the Exchange Stabilization Fund of the United 
States was set up in January 31, 1934 by the Gold Reserve Act. The 
resources of the American Fund were derived by increasing the price 
of gold from 20.67 dollars to 35 dollars per fine ounce. In addi­
tion to the original sources of 175 million pounds, the British
34 Federal Reserve Bulletin, Vol. 20, So, 2, February, 1934,
page 62.
^  It is of interest to note that today (1956) gold is 
still priced at $35 per fine ounce.
Account was further giver 200 million pounds in May, 1933 and another 
200 million pounds was added to it in July, 1937.3̂
Although there had been .government interventions1 to eliminate 
or mintage seasonal, fluctuations ..of foreign, exchanges -before .and. 
after iorld lar I, their objects, operations and organizations were 
different - firm  that of the'Exchange Equalization Funds, in the 1930*3. 
"Ihe distinctive characteristics of the Change Stabilization funds 
that have been set up since 1931, however, -have, been their separate 
organiaaticn, their large resources,. and the continuous, active, 
and secret .manner with tfcich the more ..important ones operate*.^
^  See the Economist, ?ol. CffllUi 2Z~'3> July %  1937*/
^  Oarifeenbein, J, f-*,. financial. Questions in Onlted States 
foreign Policy, page 28 • ihe reason'for incorporating the stabilize-* 
tion fund into a separate organization is said to- be the greater 
■ secrecy permitted in its operations*
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foreign exchange held into gold either in the limited States, France 
or other -geld standard .goantries# Thus* the' Account was provided 
with.Treasury bills, the pound sterling,, gold and foreign exchange 
as assets * Consequently, the Account was. able to operate in the 
foreign exchange market and buy- or sell foreign exchange at will 
as conditions required*
Ihen the Exchange Equalisation Account purchased or sold 
sterling, its operations affected the money market -Because of 
its .purchases and sales of gold and government securities, the 
operations: of it© Account also Influenced the gold market sad the 
stock exchange, Therefore, the operations of the Account not only 
affected the foreign exchange market, but also affected the money 
market, gold market and the sfcoek exchange-,̂
During its life, the British -Exchange Equalization Account
4passed through four' different periods* The first period began 
with its establishment on duly I, 1932, -and ended -with the suspen­
sion of the gold standard by the United states- In March, 1933* 
During this period, many countries of the world, such as- the 
United States, Prance, Holland, Belgium and Switzerland remained , 
on the gold standard -and formed -a powerful group in competition
^' The London money market presents the aggregate of facili­
ties through which short term funds are loaned .and' borrowed and 
through which a large part of the financial transactions of the 
country and of the world are cleared*
* See Pumpferey, L. M., »The Exchange Equalization Account 
of great Britain”, the American Economic Review* Vol* XXXllj Mo♦ 4,1 
December, 1942, page 804.,
* Ibid*, pp, 808-812*
with the “sterling bloc.*1 the “sterling bloc« derived its name from 
the fact that seme countries followed Great .Britain in suspending 
the gold standard and linked their currency with the pound sterling*
The second .period’' covered the months from the suspension of ■ 
the gold standard by the United States- .in March, 1933* until September, 
1936* when Prance left the gold standard#: The suspension of. the gold 
standard by prance and other countries resulted In the breakdown of' 
the “gold bloe«. Consequently, the paper standard was adopted 
throughout the world#
T h e  third period started' from the time when Prance discon­
tinued the fixed relationship between the value of gold and that of
&the franc and the conclusion of the Tripartite Agreement • in 
September, 1936, until May* 193% when the Preach Government an* 
nounced its detennination to check the franc from depreciating# One 
of the consequences of -the abandonment of the gold standard by the 
countries of the world was the devaluation of currencies* The con­
clusion of the Tripartite Agreement was to provide cooperation on 
the matter of foreign exchange -among nations? and it was considered* 
at .least partly*, as a .method of eliminating the international race
^ Bee league of nations* International Currency Experience. 
pp. 50-54; also- Whittlesey, C. H#, International Monetary Issues-* 
page-177*
 ̂. On September 25, 1936 the -United States*. Great Britain and 
franc® announced that “the three countries had agreed to cooperate in 
the 'management of their- currencies with, a view to -maintaining' ‘the . 
greatest possible equilibrium*,*» Gantenbein, J.- W„, financial Ques­
tions in United States foreign Policy# page 36.
^ fha United States* Great Britain* France, Belgian* the 
Netherlands and Switzerland#
m
.ft. the exchange depreciation* Sat it wasreaXized m% long later 
that the tripartite Agreement did not bring aboai an orderly situa­
tion. ft® exchange depreciation continued through the following 
myears* W® may comment here on the disruption to confidence,, so 
necessary to international commerce, of this period of competitive 
exchange depreciation,
ft© fourth period began with the declaration of the French 
Government ft Kay,.- 193S* that the franc would not tee permitted to 
fall below the ratio of Iff franc® ft the pound:, .After ft©- announce- 
meat, the depreciation of' the franc was checked and french capital 
started it® return flight from London to Paris.
Each period was very important, from the point of view of 
the British Exchange Equalisation Account, because the beginning of 
©very period created a new situation for the Account ft face* for 
example, at, the period immediately following the establishment of 
the Exchange Equalisation Account of -Great Britain, there was-, a 
large flight of American capital to London -due to lack ©f confidence 
ft the American dollar* Facing this ■situation the Ac count had to 
adopt offsetting measures to eouateract the effect of increasing de­
mand from the dollar for the pound sterling ft order to keep sterl­
ing from appree iatftg When the United States went off the gold 
Standard end the dollar -became a «paper currency#, the Account could
ft® sterXftg-franc exchange rates fell from 7? francs ft 
the pound ft September, 1936 ft 179 francs ft -the pound ft' May, 1936*
^  Compare Sftzig, P., World Finance 19X4-1935* pp.* 239-244.
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not continue to convert the dollar into gold in the United States.
Bat this funetionof the Account could be .continued in those coun­
tries which were still, on the gold standards
In 1936 when the "gold bloc <» countries successively went off 
the gold standard, the "gold bloc" disintegrated, fh# currencies 
of leading countries in the world wera no longer convertible into 
gold, Therefore, the Exchange Equalization Account was able to boy 
only limited amounts of gold in its attempts to control the value 
of the .pound sterling in terms of gold, When the french franc 
started to depreciate* french capital flowed to louden in great 
quantity.3̂  fh# Account acted as the temporary residence for French 
money until the confidence in the franc was sufficiently recovered 
and the money began Its return trip .in. icy* 1938.^
first Period (1932-1933)
As mentioned before, the suspension of the gold standard by 
Great Britain had contributed to the return of confidence in the 
pound sterling In the latter months of 1931* although a chaotic 
currency situation occurred Immediately following the suspension.
When Great Britain left the gold standard many countries followed 
suit , These countries included most of the British Dominions and 
some of the Scandinavian countries, with the abandonment of the
2 see- |he Economist . Vol. Gmill', 3-4, July 3* 1939* and 
also page 22.
league of Nations* International Currency Experience. 
pp. 78-79 and 114,
«  See Weight, I.., tee K ietog  ang gSSfeBla 2£ M. Equalization Account, page .11,
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gold standard, those currencies became pegged to the pound sterling 
even though the pound sterling was a freely fluctuating currency at 
that time* Sweden was forced to go- off the'gold standard a few 
days after the suspension, by Great Britain became of sudden with- 
drawals of foreign funds and flight of Swedish capital to london*^ 
People moved their money frm Sweden for they realised that the depre­
ciation of the pound sterling would work hardship on Swedish exports* 
The Swedish eaqsorfc- business was largely dependent 'upon the British 
market at that time.1-'5 ' fwenty-four countries suspended their .gold 
standard between September, If$1 and April, 1932. fhe gold standard 
was inoperative in another seventeen countries although it was 
legally in force, fet the gold standard was still .in operation in 
thirty-one countries during the same period*^ '
luring 1932 and the early months of' 1933, the outflow of .gold 
from the United States continued* in addition, the weakness in the 
internal banking situation aggravated the doubt regarding the 
stability of the dollar* This doubt resulted .in hoarding of gold, 
on a large scale by domestic holders of the dollar In the United 
States, In the other hand, foreign holders ©f the dollar not only 
converted their do.ll.ar holdings .into gold, but withdrew them la the
%  league of Nations* ■ .International Surrency ■ Experience, 
page 123*
^  Ashworth* W. A,, A Short History of toe International 
Bconomy, 1850*1950. page 209.
form of gold shipment from the United States*̂ 7
fhe Exchange Equalization Account of Great Britain was estab­
lished at the time of the great crisis in the United States.; It had 
to take the .American dollar Into its.'control in relation to- the 
pound sterling* From its establishment until the suspension of the' 
gold standard, by the United States* the- main operations of the 
Account were concerned with the dollar *
fhe operation of the Exchange Equalization Account in rela­
tion. to the movements of capital and the effect of such movements
iScan be illustrated as follows;
the Exchange Equalisation Account was given Treasury bills 
equivalent to 150 million pounds- at the time of its establishment. 
The account of the Exchange- Equalisation Account would show:
The Exchange legalisation Account^)
(in pounds)
Capital ip- Treasury bills 150
The Exchange Equalization Account was to- sell Treasury biHa 
In order to obtain -sterling when there was’ an inflow of foreign 
funds* Assuming 100 .million pounds of foreign money had flowed to 
London and the Exchange Equalization Account converted half Of it
17 Binzig,■P., World Finance 1911-1935, page 247. -Also see 
Comstock, A., "The .British Exchange Equalization Account-’** the 
American̂ Econofflie Review,-Vol. Hill, No* 4, December* 1933*
^  For this illustration compare Harris, s* E,, Exchange De­
preciation, pp. 408-409* Since the operations of the Account are 
secret* this illustration is based on assumption,
(w> Bee Harris* S. E., Exchange Depreciation, page 408*
Into gold, then the account would be:
The Exchange Equalization Account̂ 20) 
(In million pounds)
Capital 150 Treasury bills 0
Foreign exchange 50mu
If the Exchange Equalization Account sold gold, or other assets 
to the Bank ©i England for deposit, it was an increase in the public 
deposit* Assuming the sale- to the -Bank was equal to 0  million pounds 
of Treasury bills and 50 million pounds of gold, then the account of 
the Bxchange Equalization Account would be changed as follows;
Since the Bank of England could btsy gold only at a legal- price 
of 77s* %•, losses would be incurred if the Exchange Equalization 
Account purchased gold at a price higher than the legal price ̂  .-If 
the- legal price was only equal to SO' per cent- of market price, the 
Account could obtain only 40 million pounds- for the gold for which 
it had paid 0  million pounds* The loss incurred by the Account 
would be 10 million pounds--* Therefore, the Account of' the Exchange'
The Exchange Equalization AccountC*
<la Billion pounds)
Capital 15© Foreign exchange
-Public deposit
lf§
-See Harris, S* 1*,- Exchange Bepreciation. pp.* 408-409*
(2l) Ibid*
Equalization Account would fee*
/ 2̂  |The Exchange- Equalization Account''5 
(.In million pounds )
Capital fqreî i exchange
ifi$» fufeli© depositPub c
One of the functions of the Exchange Equalization Account ms 
to control the amount of sterling in the exchange market in. relation 
to the demand , for example* the supply of the pound sterling would 
fee increased in ’accordance, with the increased demand for the pound 
Sterling* Foreigners might also purchase the treasury feill#: sold fey 
the Account * ' •
On the other hand* if there was a. flight from the pound 
.Sterliiig*. the Exchange Equalization Account might- sell- foreign cur* 
rency or currencies or gold in order to absorb the pound sterling . 
.which the holders would like to convert into foreign money* This is 
to ©ay that the - Account bought sterling asset© and sold non-sterling 
assets' when there m m  those who wanted to purchase foreign money*2!* 
It has been, mentioned that, the- confidence In the- pound sterl­
ing ms weak: In the summer -of 1931 and there was a wholesale, flight.' 
..from the pound*.- AS’ a result*, there was - a heavy outflow of'gold fro® 
louden* The gold movement of Great Britain in 1931 -and the succeed* 
ing years can- fee seen in the following tables
(l3) gee Harriŝ  S* £.* Exchange Bepreciation* .page 4©9»
Economist, Vcl* GIVI; sup %  iay 13, 1933.
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Sold movement of Great Britain 
(In thousands of dollars) 
Export (-)
1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938
Jan -43,470 -7,3$) -43,260 62,146 *4,279 41,974 -25,523 27,245Feb 2,443 -6,182 18,400 184,820 •36,566 38,649 122,296 51,387Mar 6,452 -2,691 77,198 91,471 66,557 47,666 78,484 79,037Apr 24,064 26,-148 64,767 35,003 36,529 77,137 12,036 53,186May 19,122 16,973 97,386 37,986 146,289 74,590 -48,319 97,478JUB 54,300 35,019 77,671 53,056 118,067 69,447 22,957 89,580Jul •130,808 22,675 89,056 30,991 16,289 195,066 127,953 24,H9
Aug -24,150 1,296 25,628 26,005 39,016 281,401 122,643 -73,132Sep -9,251 5,204 48,260 23,488 -36,086 151,814 -29,775 -261,143Oct 13,040 5,814 63,918 ‘49,999 -36,158 7,615 -6,438 ■-210,171Nov *44,977 13,857 79,138 49,585 13,286 83,168 22,054 -96,508Bee -15,602 -29,582 79,426 27,215 40,811 100,505 20,976 -66,726
Sources*. Federal Reserve Bullet in-Vol. 1?, Ho* 7, Jul 1931# p. 401.
" (25) Vol. 18, Ho. 7, Jul 1932, p* 441*
Vol. 19, Ho* 7, Jul 1933, p. 438.
Vol. 20, Ho. 7, Jul 1934, p. 474*
Vol. 21, Ho* 7, Jul 1935, P* 461.
Vol. 22, Ho. 7, Jul 1936, p. 601.
Vol. 23, Ho. 7, Jul 1937, p. 688.
Vol. 24, Ho. 7, Jul 1938, p. 623*
Vol. 25, Ho. 4, Apr 1939, p. 338.
As shown in the above table, during the months of July and August, 
1931, the outflow of gold from Great Britain was equal to 130.8 
million dollars and 24*2 million dollars respectively and the figure 
for the month of September was 9.3 million dollars. la October of 
that year, gold movement reversed and there was a net import of 15.7 
million dollars^ of gold into Great Britain. But the outflow of 
gold that began in November continued until the month of March in the 
following year, although the value of the outward movements of gold
25 Mote: Some of the figures provided in the Federal Reserve
Bulletin are preliminary estimates. For example, the figure of 15.7 
million dollars is a corrected figure obtained from the December, 
1932 issue of the Federal Reserve Bulletin.
gradually declined. la November, 1931, there ms a net eaporfc of 
nearly 45,0 million dollars of golds in March, 1932, if amounted to 
only 2*7 million dollars. In .April, 1932, the movement 'was reversed 
and the net import of gold ms equal to 26,1 million dollars, this 
inflow continued, until November, 1932,
Baring, the period. 1931*1933* the exchange ratio between the
i
dollar and the pound sterling declined greatly. the fall, of exchange 
rate can be seen la the following table,, •'
the Sterlimg-Boilar Exchange Bate 
(Monthly averages of daily quotations)
1931 1932 1933 i m 1935 1936 1937 1938
Jan 3,43 3*36 5,05 4*69 4.96 4*91 ■5,©0Feb 3.46 3*42 5,03 4,87 5*0© 4*89 ‘5*02
Mar 3,64 3*43 5*09 4178 •4*97 4*89 4*98
Apr 3.75 3.58 5.15 4,84 4*94 4.92 4,98
May 3.68 3*93 5.11 4*89 4*97 4,94 4*98
Jun 3*65 ' 4,14 5,©5 4.93 5*02 4*94 4*96
Jul 3,55 4*65 .5*04 4*96 5*02 4.97 4*93AUg 4,86 3*48 4150 5*07 4.97 3,03 4*96 4,88Sep 4*53 3.47 4*66 4*99 4.93 5*04 4*93 4,80
Oct 3.89 3.40 4*67 ■ 4*94 . 4.91 4*90 4,96 4.77
Bov 3,72 3.28 5.15 4,99 4*92 4.89 5*00 4,71©ec 3,37 3.28 5*12 4*95 4,93 4*91 5.00 4*67
Sources* Reserve Bullet in-Vol, 10, Bo.,. 7* Jul 1932, p. .449,
7ol, 19, io, 7, Jul 1933, P* 446,
Tol, 20, Bo, 7, Jul .1934, p, 482,
Vol. 21, Bo* 7, J«i 1933, p* 469,
?ol. 22, Ste* 7, jul 1936, p. 60f*
701. 0, Bo, 7, Jul 1937, P* 696.
' 24, Bo, 7, Jul 1938, p* 631,
• 25> Bo, 4, Apr 1939, p*
It was mentioned in Chapter III that the sterling-dollar ex­
change ratio had fallen from 4.86 dollars to the pound on September 
tl,. to 3.94 dollars to the pound on October 1, 1931, The ratio fell 
to 3.72 to 1 In November and 3.37 to 1 in December,
sterling-dollar ratio was 3*43 to 1 and 3.46 to 1 in January 
February, respectively in 1932. M  March and Aprils the sterling 
exchange rate showed a rising trend..,. .In other words, the heavy 'in­
flow of foreign funds and repatriation of British capital caused the 
pound sterling to appreciate.̂  lot through the rest of 1932, the 
sterling exchange ratio- declined .from 3*6$ to 1 In June to 3,28 to 
1 in. November and December, this downward trend of the .sterling, 
exchange ratio .might be said to have conformed with -one ■ of the ob­
jects of the Exchange Equalization Account to maintain the external 
value of the pound .sterling, at a low level*.
Toward the end of 1932, treat Britain faced the problem of
27war loan payments to the inited States, ' and it was the anticipation 
by the market that, the British Government would purchase the dollars 
to make the payment Which caused' the pound sterling to depreciate 
sharply in November and December, 1932, At the time of depreciation, 
the Exchange Equalization Account had made effort# to support the 
pound sterling, but because of inadequate holdings of foreign ex­
change and gold the Account failed Id its attempt. It was also
claimed that the Account stepped aside from the exchange market dur- 
28log this period, Consequently, the exchange rate reached a low 
point of 3*28 dollars to the pound* But «»hea it became known that
28 See the Economist. Vol. CXVIXIj sup '2*3, May 5, 1934*
^  Comstock, A., "the British Exchange Equalisation Account", 
the American Economic Review, Vol. XXIII, .Bo* 4, ■ December, 1933,
Ibid.
payment would, be made in the form of a gold shipment, confidence 
in the pound sterling was .restored gradually, far this payment there 
was a net export of 29*6 million dollars in gold, in'December, 1932, 
and 43*3 million dollars la gold in. January, 1933* However, the 
return of confidence in the pound sterling also contributed to the. 
recovery of sterling*
.In the early months of 1933, the internal banking crisis In' 
the United States accentuated the flight from the dollar to- the 
pound sterling* In addition, the deficit budgets of the french 
Government after 193© resulted in- a distrust of the franc*- Ihus, 
there was 'also an increasing amount of the French franc flowing to
wthe pound sterling-* facing, this situation, the Exchange Equali­
zation Account had to take actions to stop unwanted appreciation of 
the- pound -sterling* As the purchases of go-M .and foreign exchange 
were increased., the resources of the Account were used Up quickly. 
Consequently another 200 million pounds was added to- the sterling
Ihe gold movements of the United States were closely related 
to the position of the dollar, the franc and the pound. In the 
month of October, 1931, the gold movement of the United States was 
reversed and a net export .of 337*9 million dollars of gold from the.
29 linzig, P., World finance 1914-1935. page 242.
30 See the Economist* Vol. CX.VIII, 70-71, January 13, 1934? 
also Vol. CXVI,*Xo, May' 13, 1933* ■
31- palsh, F. ?!*, *lhe British Exchange Equalization Fund,« 
Economlca. Jfe» Series, toi* II, Ho* 5-8, page S6*
United States was reported, this reversal ms doe to the chaotic
32currency situation, in the United States.' Of this amount of export, 
'part of it ms ©hipped to Great Britain but most of it ms absorbed 
by France. France's import of gold fro®, the United States in the 
month of October, 1931 was 324.5 million dollars.
®ie outflow of gold from the United States persisted daring 
the .first half of 1932, and reached its peak th May .-and don# that 
year; 195*5 million dollars and 206.0 million dollar© were exported 
In the respective months*̂ 3 In the latter part of 1932* there was a 
sign of ©light recovery from the great depression la the United 
State.©* ̂  Commodity price© ©bowed a tendency to rise, the movements 
of gold reversed .and there was flow of gold to the United States. • 
fhs gold movements to the United State© were 100*$ million dollars 
in January, 1933*35
During this period of uncertainty in the United State© and' 
Great Britain, the situation in franco was comparatively ©table. 
During the year© 1931. and. 1932, there was a consistent inflow- move-* 
mom of gold to franco* the annual' report- of the Bank of France for
'si
the year 1932, declared that there was an increase of gold reserve
32 federal Reserve Bulletin* Vol. M, fie* 7, July, 1932,
lag© 440.
33 federal gee.e-rve Ballet in* Vol.* .1$, ho* 10, October, 1932'* 
page 64$*
^  See Einzig, p., World Finance, 1914-1935. page 252*
federal Reserve Bulletin. Vol. 19, Mo. 7, July, 1933*
page 437* ' '
^  federal Reserve Bulletin* Vol. 19, Mo. 3, March*. 1953, 
page 149*.
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3.43 dollars to the pound to March. As the dollar depreciated, there
eas a sharp appreciation of the pound sterling, toe exchange rate
reached 4.13 dollars to the'pound in dune -and 5*14 dollars to the.
37pound to Movemher, 1933.
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involved.'*9 But many countries of the world still maintained the gold 
standard at that time; the Account ms able to shift its operations 
from the dollar to- other gold currencies. Owing to its leading posi­
tion in the "gold bloc* countries after the abandonment of the gold 
standard by the. United States, fee franc became the .main object^ of 
the operations of the British Exchange Equalization Account.
One of the important effects of the depreciation of a currency 
is said to be its contribution to- fee improvement of the foreign trade 
posit ion of a country, In 1931* the balance of trade of Great Britain, 
was very unfavorable# It ms reported that the'excess of imports over 
exports me 408 million pounds in the year 1931# After Great.Britain 
left the gold standard in the fall of 1931, the pound sterling de­
preciated, and the balance of trade improved to a large extent# the 
excess- of imports over exports declined t#. 287 million pounds in 
1932 and. 263 million pounds in 1933* The value of excess imports
ZlIfor 1934 and 1935 das 294 and 261 million pounds respectively.
In the year 1931* there was the net outflow of gold of 143*7 
million dollars from Great Britain* Prom April, 1932 onward, the 
trend of gold movement- reversed and there was net Import for the year
29 According to one of the principles of the operations of 
the Exchange Equalization Account it only purchased currencies which 
could be converted into gold on demand in order to avoid loss by 
foreign exchange transactions*
After fee United States suspended the gold standard in 
1933, the French franc became fee most important currency in the 
"gold bloc" and the situation of fee franc began to deteriorate at 
feat time*
^  See Harris, S. E., Exchange Depreciation, page 469.
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of 84*6 million dollars of gold to Great Britain, The surplus of .gold' 
imports was 677.4 million dollars for 1933, 716*3 million dollars for 
1934 and 369,7 million dollars for 1935*42
As stated before, -after the suspension of the gold standard 
by the Suited States, the Exchange Equalization Account directed 
its operations toward gold currencies, such as- the French franc 
and the Swiss franc. In January 31, 1934, the- United states, again 
relinked the dollar to gold by the Gold Reserve Act,- in which the 
• value of the dollar was depreciated by 59,06 per cent of its old 
content*4̂  the Gold ieserve Act did not restore the dollar to a 
fully operative gold standard; holders of the dollar were not per* • 
mi tied to convert it into- gold* Consequently, the Exchange Squall* 
nation Account was Still unable .to operate against the dollar. the 
operations of the Account continued toward the currencies of the 
"gold, bloc15.
From the time the United States suspended the gold standard 
until the breakdown of the «goid bloc11, capital movements and- for* 
sign exchange were comparatively stable both in the United States 
and Great Britain, But the- situation in France had changed;44 there 
were outflows of capital, from frame from time to time, accompanied 
by a net export of gold. The gold reserves and foreign exchange of
42■ federal Reserve .Bulletin, Vol. 19, No. ?, July, 1933, 
page 430* -federal Reserve Bulletin, Vol. 22, No, 7, July, 1936, 
page- 601.
4** Federal Reserve Bulletin, Vol. 20, 10* Z* February, 1934*
44 Compare the Economist, Vol. CXX, sup 8*9, February 16, 1935♦
the Baids of France declined m  time elapsed* In 1932, there was a 
net import of 828 million dollars into France* and in 1933, 243*9 
million dollars worth of gold* But from 393k onward there were 
net exports of gold, from France. the .efflux of gold, was 408 million 
dollars in 1934 and -818 attlio* dollars in 1935.46
During the ■fears preceding the suspension of the gold standard 
fef Great Britain, the french franc was under-valued in, terms of other 
currencies* Consequently France was able to enjoy an advantageous 
position In international trade* During these years Of prosperity 
franco accumulated largo quantities of gold and foreign exchange.̂ 7 
But the depreciation of the pound sterling and the dollar resulted 
in the appreciation of the franc and other gold currencies* There­
fore, while the United States and the countries of the ''sterling 
bloe« were, recovering from depression, the depression in France and 
other %old bloc” countries was deepening. Bat the strength that 
France toad gained during the prosperous years enabled it to. resist 
the crisis long before it had to abandon the gold standard*̂
The depression in France was aggravated by its unfavorable 
. international trade position., The resisting capacity of the French 
franc declined as time went by.49 As a 'result*, there was, a whole*.
See Federal Reserve Bulletin. Vol. 20, No. 7, duly, 1934,
page 474*
^  See Federal. Reserve Bulletin, Vol. 22, No.,. 7, July, '1936, 
page 601*
&7 $#e Ein&ig, P., World Finance 1914-1935,. page 262.
^  Ibid.. pp. 262-266,
49 Compare the Economist. ¥ol. CXX; 1117*4118, lay 18, 1935*
sale flight from Paris and bh# Bank of Prance lost, its gold reserves 
heavily* Daring the period from August 7 to September 25* 1936, the 
loss of gold by the Sank of prance amounted to 320.0 million dollars* 
The aggregate' loss for the period from March, 1935 to- September 25, 
1936, was 2,100.0 million dollars./0
fee heavy flow- of gold .from prance to Great Britain during 
this period can fee seen in the f©Hoeing figures. ' the gold import of 
©peat Britain from France in the month of July, 1936 was 142*3
million' ■dollars, 24®*9 million dollars in' August and 108*7 million
S2.dollars in September, - In facing this flight of french money and 
■ ■Other gold currencies to- Eondon, the Exchange Equalization Account 
sold to the Bank of England .large quantities of gold, in- order to 
obtain the pound sterling required to counteract the contraction of 
• credit' #iich might be caused by the inflow of foreign capital*
During the period of flight from the franc, there was a 
Sharp .increase in note circulation of'-©peat Britain, and much of the 
increase In. British notes ms. hoarded' by french people/^1 Those 
notes which were hoarded could no longer perform the function as 
medium of exchanges the effect was deflationary..
Third'period (1936-1938)
As the gold reserves of the ..Bank, of France came to the margin
federal Reserve Bulletin* Vol. 22, ho* 10, October, 1936,
page 76®w
51 federal Reserve Bulletin, Vol. 23> Mo, 7, duly, 1937,. 
page 608, •
Gee Weight, L., The history and Mechanism of the Exchange 
Equalization Account, chapter ""?......  .....
of exhaustion, the French Government had to suspend the gold standard 
in September 26, 1936,55 five years after the depreciation of the 
poundi
the breakdown of the currencies of the "gold bloc" countries 
■had seriously threatened the ability of the Exchange Equalization 
Account to control sterling exchange rates because the principal 
■currencies of the world were no longer convertible, into gold# The 
Control'of the value of the pound sterling in terms of gold by the 
Exchange Equalization Account was limited to its open market opera* 
tions j the Account bought .and sold gold in the market at a price 
which ms decided by the Account# But this operation of the Account 
produced little effect because the amount of gold coming into the 
gold market ms small*
la September, 1936, at the same time the »gold bloc® coun­
tries suspended their gold standard, an arrangement -known as the 
tripartite .Agreement was concluded among the felted States, Orest 
Britain and France- in order to have coordinated action in the in­
ternational financial affairs* Belgium, Holland and Switzerland ad­
hered to this agreement shortly after.5k The countries agreed to* 
avoid competitive exchange depreciation, to eliminate excessive ex­
change fluctuation and to maintain- foreign exchange at the existing
53 See ths Economist. Vol. CXJCH; 2k, October 2, 1937, also
federal Reserve Bulletin. Vol. 22* Bo, 10, October,- 1936*
5k Federal Baaerre Bullet Ia, Vol. 22, fe. 11,, November,- 1936*
55 Gantenbeia, J* w., Financial Questions, in 'felted States, Foreign Policy, page 37* ■' ■ ■ - -
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Agreement because of political uncertainty; floating, moit&f was again
59moving from one place to another in seeking security.
Through this period, there was heavy flight of flench capital 
to London. With the except ion of small-scale return .movements of 
the French franc, in February and. October* 1936 and Say, 1937, it 
was almost a one-way movement of the franc to the pound,,'*8 This ' 
import of French capital- required the- Exchange Equalisation Account 
to sell, sterling and buy the franc in- large amounts. The franc thus 
obtained was converted into gold through the sale tit gold by the/ 
cooperation of other exchange equalisation funds.
.1ft 1937} the sterling resources of the British Exchange Equali­
sation Account m m  nearly exhausted, and it was, necessary to increase 
its capital if the Account was to continue its operations, Conse­
quently, m  additional ,200- million pounds' was added to. its resources 
1® July of that year,'*7
Fourth Period (1938-1939)
la May, 1938, however, the situation changed fundamentally 
when.- the 'French Government announced, that the exchange rate between 
the franc and the pound would not he permitted to fall, below 179 
francs to the pound, The determination of the French Government
57 See the Economist, fol,. CXJOX* 644*445, Secembey 25, 1937, 
also- League of Nations, international Currency ISxperience, pp. 7S-79,
H4-.
Compare Waight, The History and Mechanism of the :£mbWf^ 
Equalisation Account, chapters 4 add 7*
to maintain the stability of the franc had immediately increased eon*
60fidence in the franc* In fact, since the franc had been sent to 
London when the pound-franc exchange rate ms at a higher-level, a 
considerable profit would result if the funds were repatriated at the 
new rate* therefore, it resulted in a great rush to convert sterling 
balance into the franc m  the part of French nationals who held sterl­
ing .balances*. It was estimated, that the ■amount of capital, transferred 
to France from London was about 80 million pounds in the first four 
days following the announcement *6*
From the viewpoint of the Exchange Equalization Account,' there 
was a great difference between the situation in the fall of 1936 and 
that in May, 1930'* In the period of flight from the franc to the 
pound in 1936, before France .suspended its gold standard, the value 
of the franc was based on the ..gold content of the franc, While in 
lay, 1938, the franc had become a "paper franc" and its value became 
a matter of decision by French authorities* Iherefore, in 1936 the 
British Exchange Equalization Account could convert its holdings of 
the French franc into gold at a fixed price in the time of flight 
to the pound, but th# Account was unable to do this in 1938 because 
of changing rates fixed by French authorities from time to time.
however, by years of experience and strength gained in the 
past, the Exchange Equalization Account was able to face this situa-
Compare Paish, F* W*, "twenty Years of the Floating Debt«, 
Economics, Hew Series, Vol. FI, Ho* 21-24 (1939), pp. 267-
4 Weight, L., J^e History and Mechanism of the Exchange 
Equalization Account, page
i
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operation fey the Account restored its original assets *
the Exchange Equalization Account of great Britain was again 
confronted with a new problem in late duly and August, 1938 wheait 
m& realized that the dollar was undervalued and a large volume of.4 
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exchange control on September 4, 1939*6̂
In the- United States the Exchange Stabilization Fund was .net 
heeded to Support the dollar in terns of ether currencies because 
the dollar ms 'on. its way to recovery from the time of its deprecia­
tion. Consequently, the operation of' the American Fund was .mainly 
one-sidedj to support gold currency owing to- the export and balance 
of payment difficulties since 'the depreciation of the dollar.^ 
the United States Stabilization fund did not attempt to 
support the- exchange rate of foreigi currency at a certain. level, 
hut assisted foreign countries in transferring gold, to the' United. 
State# or made the- dollar available for foreign countries against- . 
foreign earmarked gold.66
the Exchange Equalization .fun-# contributed to a 'great extent 
to. the reduction of fluctuations of exchange rate and the restoration 
of smoothness in international transaction#- during: the great uncer­
tainty .in. the 193U*#*6^
64 .fee .the Economist. Vol. CMMI-, 493-4%, September, 1939, 
and the American Sconoiaie Review, Vol. Mill, No. 4, December, 191#, 
pager|i3......
*>5 Sake and Salera, International. Icoaemics:* pp. 5U6-5U8.
66 Ibid* »■ pag# m*
^  See Humphrey, L. M., "the Exchange Equalisation Account of 
Ureat Britain.”'the-'American Economic levlew. Vol. XXXII, tto* 4, 
December, 194-2,- pp . B03-81o7 also ' 'league of Nations, International 
Currency Experience.. pp. 143-161. Ad shown in table on page" 55 of 
this thesis bhe. sterlJng-dollar exchange rates had been relatively stable since'Uulyt 1933'oward.
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destroyed, k country could died choose to manage the external value 
Of its currency by means of an exchange stabilisation fund. The fun< 
would participate in. the exchange market as a buyer or a seller of
.
»
■
01ft•a0lM4?®©
•&w
4 ftft
I 
I
I ^
I I 
I 
*
* 
1
0jq ■**04 *>sI 
*
<3 
t}
I 1
I 1
I ^
I 8
<M 
■...
I 
3
a•Hft
. 
^
&
*
0 
U
0 
a>
1 1$*
8 
I
«H 
O
1 
a
1 I
^ 
fto 
■ o4*I0♦o■o
4
3
.
1As>
m§4»SO
»'•
f
t
'
1-*3
0
% 
*
® 
M
S 
°#
.
f
t
5 t
| 
J*
, . 5 
1 J I
I I
m
Io"*>■(3.©38ti©1Q’Q I©mI14J>%fI
«ll8I&<a
I t©i
*%o>
currency in terms of the other could be derived by calculating the 
ratio of gold content of different aioneys* however, the actual ex- 
change rate fluctuated ..around the ratio according to the demand and 
supply position of the currencies-- concerned* the range of fluctuafe 
tions ms limited fey the cost of transporting the gold, from the 
financial center of one country to that of another* The exchange 
rates would -not fall below the low limit or rise above the upper 
limit because if the exchange rate was too high or too low it would 
pay to export or import gold*. Thus- under the international gold stan­
dard, the exchange rates were fixed within these narrow limits; ex­
change rates were stable* The stability of exchange rates was a 
great - advantage -from- the point of view of exporters,, importers and 
international investors.* The risk in international trade ms- mini­
mised because there would not fee any sudden rise or fall of exchange 
rate. The exporters and importers could calculate properly the cost 
and profit which would be incurred or could be derived from their 
trading transactions. The stability of exchange- also stimulated 
capital investments in- foreign countries because loss- of capital 
value would not occur under stable exchanged
The internat ional gold standard was adopted fey many countries 
of the world, during the great expansion of the international economy 
in the nineteenth century. ' It was the standing economy and the 
existence of international equilibrium t#*ich made the adoption of 
the gold standard possible* But the stability of foreign exchange
3 See ConcQLiffe, J. B.t The Commerce of Nations.;, chapter XII, 
also Halm, G* E.*, Monetary Theory, chapter 12.
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tant cosmodities, feat it ms also used as an instrument for the 
furtherance of economic and political power both at' home .sod abroad 
fith exchange control, a government can■exercise a great influence 
over economic activities} the liberty of individuals in foreign ex­
change transactions is seriously affected or destroyed. As a result* 
exchange control becomes a great obstacle to international trade and 
settlement, the experience of the 1920‘s and the 1930*s indicates 
that they should not be introduced if they can be avoided*̂
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balance of payments and there is no prospect of restoring equlli*- 
brium* strict exchange control will likely be introduced; for, if 
the balance of payment difficulty of a country is persistent* it •will 
result in the exhaustion of the country<s foreign assets unless
t I s
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See Sake and Salera, International Economics, page 501
*,.the most active Exchange Funds were developed 
as instruments for a&idnistering an international 
.gold settlement .system which was the successor .in 
a large part of the world Of the international gold 
standard .system.,, 'this development in turn was the 
product of a compromise between the principle of 
national sovereignty over monetary policy .and the 
principle of adaptation to the .requirements of 
membership in '.a world monetary system-,?
the British Exchange Equalisation Account was- the first of
the six. exchange stabilization funds to fee established during the
1930’s after the gold, standard was suspended.- It was- said, to fee
,ran experiment and, as in all experiments, there,are possibilities
of failure as ‘well as possibilities of success therein. <1®
prom the viewpoint, of the stability of sterling in terms of
foreign currencies, the British. Exchange Equalization Account was
successful as "an experiment" In keeping the value of the pound
sterling stable In the face of changing value of -other currencies *
As shown te the'table on page 55, the variation in the sterling-
dollar exchange m s  relatively' small from the latter part of 1931
through the following years* The annual percentage change of
sterling in terms of dollars was 5*7 per -cent in both 1934 and 1935*
the per cent range of variation in 1936 was 4*1 per cent and 3*2 
11per cent in 1937*
The general principles of the British Exchange Equalization
 ̂ .league of Hations, international Garreacy Experience, 
page 143,
Waijght, !*» The History and Mechanism of the Exchange 
Equalization Account, page 128? ‘  ‘ '
11 league of nations, Monetary Review, 1937-1938, page 27*
Account were imitated fey the leading countries of the world as a tub* 
atltute for‘the gold standard.22 Shin creation of the exchange 
equalization. Hmd produced an intermediary system of International 
settlement between the gold standard .and exchange control,, Although 
the equalization fund derice is a. mild form of exchange control in 
one seme* it is suitable for a country which is unable to. base its 
monetary system on the gold standard but. is not In need of drastic, 
measures of exchange control*. Under its. operations,, the foreign 
exchange rate is flexible to a certain, extent but undue fluctua­
tions are eliminated, freedom of transactions in the exchange mar­
ket is. maintain©!*' la other words* .the exchange stabilization fund 
device enables a country to maintain the advantages of the gold 
standard and avoid the disadvantages of exchange octroi to a cer­
tain extent.^
With the termination of World' far 1, efforts mere made fey
nations' to revive the gold .standard*, largely under fee stimulation.
laof the memory of the "good old days.»*** fhe efforts failed due to 
the -inadequate supply ..and maldistribution of gold* . Motwithstanding 
this* attention had been -directed toward, international.cooperation 
to restore multilateral .International trade-* • Ihe .Supreme Economic 
Council held in larch* 1920, recommended that the countries, ere*
Cotdpare. Whittlesey * C. B., International Monetary Is sues *
pp. 5*13,
' ̂  Compare Puaphrey* X* •»** "the Exehaags Equalization. 
Account of Great Britain,» the American Economic Review. Vol. XXXII, 
Ho* 4, December, 1942, pp. 1&3-S&. "
24 See Einzig, P.* World Finance 1914-1935, pp. 109*111*
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France,Nothing resulted from this proposal, although retaliatory 
measures against the operations of the- British Exchange Equalization 
Account■were deemed Inevitable; the judgaent of. the appropriateness 
of intervention in the exchange market ms an independent' decision 
of the British Account,^
2h reacting to the British Exchange Equalization Account* the 
United Stales in Aprils 1934, founded its Exchange Stabilisation 
Fund, said be be essentially Retaliatory" to the depreciation of 
the pound stoning,^ _ In addition to .smoothing oat unaa&te* fluctua­
tions of exchange, rate ̂ the .Fund was designed to "defend" the "dollar 
exchange rate from the effect of the change it\ the value of foreign 
currencies*;^
"The area Of free exchange rates- ms much restricted during 
the years when Exchange Funds were being developed and generalized, 
attd within this shrinking1 j, though large, area Exchange Funds inter-* 
vened In the free market for reasons as different as doaination, 
.retaliation̂ , preservation and adaptation,
In the course of its life, 'tee British .Exchange Equalisation 
Account faced different situations, at different periods* Before
*# league of Nations» M & S g & m k  M§jgflg?t>t>a&e 3Jl4*j" *ij. .*
^  Compare Sake and. Saiera, International Ecmmice, pp. 582-
m  MMt* 583*584.
61 See league of JJat4o«s* 3^^ ^EHlSSSS#
page 144.-*
^  league of Nations, International Gurrency Experience. 
page-145* -
Ifm with the United States of- leave the pound. sterling at m everW&k* 
.lied level, the fheh that-the dollar̂ sterling exchange ratio was shove 
the #11. parity #f 4*86 dollars t# the pound suggested that the British' 
atthorities- did not attempt to depreciate the pound ste#l|iig in the
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was influenced by other than economic considerations.
With the conclusion of the bipartite Agreement in September, 
1936, the Exchange stabilization Funds entered a new stage of their' 
life, The purpose of the Agreement was to Maintain the exchange 
stability of their currencies»1,26 By the arrangement announced in 
October of that year, cooperation among stabilization funds was for 
the first time provided on a twenty-four hour basis, ̂  tee idea of 
the tripartite Agreement is closely related to that of the .Interna*. 
tional Monetae Fund which was oreated by the Bretton Woods Confer­
ence 4 .^change stability, orderly exchange arrangements and'the 
avoidance of eempetitive exchange depreciation have a prominent 
place among the purposes of the Fund -(International Monetary fund)
In the conclusion of this study# we may quote the 
paragraph:
"...As a substitute for the great adjustability of 
the Ideal gold standard so far as the balance of pay* 
meats is concerned, it is apparent that under paper 
standards the device of an exchaage-equalization fund 
offers -a medium for effecting direct adjustments in 
the balance' of payments , this medium is no less 
immediately available than, the means provided by the 
gold standard, With intelligent administration, the 
stabilization fund can, in fact, fee even more mobile 
or adjustable than .gold or ordinary credits. Ah 
equalization fund consists primarily of short-term 
credits that can fee .maneuvered according to the will
&  Be© Qantenhein, J, ?/,, ginanoial Questions in United States 
Foreign Policy, pp, 36-38,
2? Enke and Salera, International Economics, page 530,
2B Bswtrey, B* G„ Bretton foogg |gr ggfctgr 21 lEB#
m
0# tie monetary authorities. M  possesses the advan* 
tage that it. is controlled and therefore I# not sab* 
Jeeb- to the influence of panid* St should never •
■ tbs- perverse or t»la<l|iststeSe* character that - '-
1M* at times, characterized movements of gold and Short* 
ter® of edit* ' ■̂ e.pofsiteilitr'had been edgiest®4 of" a ' 
-%m Of the exchange rates developing oat of a conflict 
;ef t&e polities Of iHferept ̂ bangf^eoh^izgtlon " 
fend9* It seems very doubtful, on the basis of both . 
fheerr and ê sfiehea* that ,this :Oonstit̂ es 4 sigggfr* 
Ilosni probability. It Is much more probable that the 
next stage in the developient of -International m®*#*- 
tnsy cooperation *&£ consist of close nerMag among
ibitbiesey* $* ft.,.. PP*
yS»
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fable IM
Period
1876-80
1881-85
1886-90
1891-951896-00
1901-051906-10
1911-13
1913
1921-25
1926-291930
1931-35
1936-38
WORLD TRADE IN MANUFACTURED 
(Annual averages) 
Actual values at the old Total value
articles
Indices nO.̂S8£55
parity (in $000,000*8) ($000,000*8) Value Quan­ Price
Imports Exports fatal
at 1913 
prides
(in
geld)
tum (in
gold)
2,480 2,290 4,770 4,877 31.4 32.1 97.82,810 2,600 5,410
5,600
, 6,065 35.7 40.0 89.2
2,900 2,700 6,846 36,9 45.1 81.82,890 2,720 5,610 6,960 37.0 45.9 80.6
3,370 3,230 6,600 i , m 43.5 48.0 90.64,160 3,990 8,150 9,588 53.7 63.2 85.05,620 5,400 11,020 11,824 72.6 77.9 93.27,250 6,920 14,170 14,504 93.4 95.6 97.77,720 7,450 15,170 15,170
n  ,621
lOO.O aoo.o 100.0
10,880 10,410 21,290 140.3 76.6 183.212,920 12,4̂ 0 25,320 15,825 166.9 104.3 160.011,310 10,77© 22,080 15,123 145.6 99.7 146.0
5,380 5,130 10,510 11,449 69.3 75.5 91,85,500 5,290 10,790 13,977 71.1 92.1 77,2
Table II*
TOIL HADE IN PRIMARI PRODUCTS
(Annual averages)
Period Actual values atthe old 
parity (in f000#000»s)
1876-80
1881-851886-90
1891-951896-00
1901-051906-10
1911-13
1913
1921-25
1926-29
1930
1931-35
Imports Exports
4*580
4,990 
5,500 
6 ,440 
7,780 
10,03c 
12,670 
13,330 36,900 
21,310 
17,770 
8,910 
9*070
3,720
4,360
4,260
6.920
8.920 
11,400 12,000 
15,250 
19,210 
16,230
7,930
8,060
fetal
8,300
9,050
9,250
10,150
11*900
14,700
18,950
24,070
25,330
32,150
40,520
34,000
16*840
17,130
Total value Indices (1913*100) of:
($O0Q,OGO*s) Value Quan­ Price
at 1913 (in tum (in
prices gold) geld)
7,905 32.8 31.2 1059,628 35.7 38,0 9411,280 36.5 44.5 8213,033 40.1 51*4 7815,256 47.0 60.2 78
17,927 58.0 70.8 82
21,056 74.8 83*1 90
24,561 95.0 97*0 98
25,330 100.0 100.0 100
21,723 126.9 85.8 148
28,535 360.0 112*7 142
30,357 134.2 119.8 112
27,161 66.5 107.2 62
29,534 67.6 116,6 58
Ŝources League of Nations, Industrlalization and Foreign Trader p. 157.
IHDUSTEIAL PRGBUCTION 
(1929 * 100)
1932 1937* 1932 , m f
133 France ' - 72/ 82 :
Japan 93 Belgium 69
Norway 93 Italy 67Sweden S9 : 149 ■ Czechoslovakia ■ 64 • , >Holland 84 Poland . . 63
O.K. . 84 124- ■ Canada 58 tItotananla 82 Sernany 53 117 *
Hungary 82 U.S. A* 53 ■ 103
F̂igures in breaks refer %& industrial production in 1937 
lewis, W, A., Bconomc Surrey 1919*1939* pp. 61-69.
table If 
SQUAB PEICES Of SELECTS) MONEYS
Average Friee Percent Average trie® Percent
in February Beeline in Increase,
1929 Sep, Jan. Feb.
to Feb, 1933 1934 fee
Jan.
British Found 
French Franc 
Austrian Pound 
Canadian Collar
84. #3.422 
0*039 
4 M  2.722 
0*992 0;335
30
4316
#4.665 
O.058 
3*3o.<
#5., 032 
'0.065 
4.088 
0.992
49
m
m
Source* See Chandler* 1. f.« the Economics of Honey and Banking. pp. 150*
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* Compi^y, 19B5 .......
Chandler, L. V,, The Economics of Money and Banking. New York? 
iarper and Brothers.̂  1953•
Condliffe, J* B.« The Commerce of -Nations. Mew forks W. W* Horton 
and Company, 1950.
Crowtfeer, G.,to Ogtline-ef Money, London: Thomas Helson and Sons# 
Ltd*, 1949*
Crump, 3f« B., The ABC of Foreign Exchange, London: MacMillan andTi. Ja l "" :unrTr-1Qoiap-at̂  > X95&
ELneig, P. , Exchange Control* London; The MacMillan Company.# 1934..
Einzig, P., World. Finance 1914«»1935. Hew .Yorks ■ The MacMillan 
Gompany,i935.
Ellis, .H*..S*, Exchange Control in Central Europe* Cambridge; Harvard 
University Press, 1941,'
,. B,. and Salera, V., International Economics. Hew York*' Prentice
Faono, M*., Kortftal and Abnormal International Capital Transfers* 
Minneapolis; ' University' of Minnesota Press, 1939.
Gantenbein, J. W., Financial Questions in United States Forel«?•$>y Aiigiiciy vgg>g u vMo xiiyitxypq oy.gkw fQ <
Policy*. Hew York: GolunMalEiverslty Press, 1939*"
Griffin, C. E*, Principles of Foreign Trade. Hew Yorks The 
m m M m  C«>mpSr, ® 4 *
Hall, Sf F., The British Exchange Equalization Account. London: 
MacMillan and Company, Ltd*, 1935.
Halm, G. N«, Monetary Theory. Philadephia: The Blakiston Company,
%$!&* ■
Harris, S. E.. Exchange Depreciation, Its Theory and Its
with Some Consideration of~relafced Domestic Policies, 
Cambridge: Harvard! University Press,''I93ST
Bawtrey, R. G.. Bretton Woods for.Better or Worse. London: ' Longmans, 
Green and Company, 1946*
Hicks, «T, S., Free Trade and Modem Economies;. Manchester: Norbury, 
Loqkwoord and Company, Ltd., 1951*..
International Monetary Fund, First Annual Report on Exchange Restric­
tions. Washington 0* C., 1950.
Keynes, J, M., A treatise on Money, Vol. II. New fork: Harcourt, 
Brace and Company, 1930*
Keynes, 1. M., The Economie Consequences of Mr. Churchill. London: 
The Hogarth Freest 1925.
Kindleberger, C. P., International Economics. Homewood, Illinois; 
Richard I). limn. Inc., 1955.
League of Nations, International Currency Experience. lew York: 
Halted Nations, X944»
League of Nations, Indus trialization and Foreign Trade. Geneva,
1945.
League of Nations, Commercial Policy in the interwar Period. Geneva,
■1942.
Lewis, th A., Economic Survey. London: George Allen and Unwin lid*, 
1950*
Mikeaell, &• P., Foreign Exchange in the Postwar World. Mew York: 
Twentieth Century Fund, 1954.
Ohlifl, B., Interregional and International Trade. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1952.
Haight, L., The History and Mechanism of the Exchange Equalization 
Account* .Cambridge: "cSridge University Press, 1939*
Shittlesey, 0* R., International Monetary Issues. New fork: McGraw- 
Hill Company, 1937.
Tew, B., International Monetary Cooperation* London: Hutchinson̂  
University Xibrary, 1952.
B. PERIODICALS
The American Economic Association, The American Economic Review:
"British Exchange Equalisation Account,« Vol. XXIII, No. A, 
pp. 608-621 (December, 1933)•
"Foreign trade and Exchange Stabilization,« Vol. XXVI, No. 2, 
PP. 272-279 (dune, 1936).
"The Exchange Equalization Account of Great Britain," Vol. 
XXXII, No. ki Pp. 803-816 (December, 1962).
The American Banking Association, Banking:
"Stabilization, when as and if ," Vol. XXVIII, np, 2I-23 (May,
1936).'
The Economist :
"foreign Exchange, 1931," Vol. CXIV:sup 9-10 (fob* 13, 1932)*
"Compensated Trade, 1932, " Vol. CXV: 926 (Nov. 19, 1932).
"Crisis and Exchange," Vol. CXVI: 5IO-5XI (March 11, 1933).
dollar and Pound," Vol. CXVI: 1289-1290 (dune 17, 1933).
"Exchange Equalization Account," Vol. CXVI: sup 6-8 (Say 13, 
1933)*
"Foreign Exchange," Vol. CXVI: sup 8-10 (Feb. 18, 1933).
"Foreign Exchange in 1932," Vol. CXVI: 59-60 (dan. lA, 1933)*
"Prosperity bp Exchange Depreciation?" Vol. CXVI1: 569*570 
(September 23, 1933).
"British Exchange Equalization Account," Vol. CXVIXXi sup 1*8 
(May 5, 1934).
"Foreign Exchange in 1933," Vol. CXVXII: 70-71 (Jan. 13, 1934) 
"Foreign Exchange, 1933," Vol. CXVlIXs sup 8*9 (Feb. 17, 1934)
"Franc Dollar, " Vol. CXVIIIj 301-302 (Feb. 10, 1934),
"Six Months Foreign Exchange Movements,» Vol. CXH: 68-69 
(July 14, 1934).
••Foreign Exchange in 1934,* Vol. OX? sup 8-9 (Feb. 16, 1935),
■••Foreign- Exchange Operations, » Vol. CXX: 959-60 (Apr. 27, 1933)
••Internal Qredit and Exchange Fund,« Vol. GMs sup 7-8 ■
(Mar *** 1935).
••Sterling Exchange Standard," ̂ Vol. CXX: sup 9-10 (May 18, 1935)
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